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Objective: Based on the line operations safety 
audit (LOSA), two studies were conducted to develop 
and deploy an equivalent tool for aircraft maintenance: 
the maintenance operations safety survey (MOSS).
Background: Safety in aircraft maintenance is cur-
rently measured reactively, based on the number of audit 
findings, reportable events, incidents, or accidents. Proac-
tive safety tools designed for monitoring routine opera-
tions, such as flight data monitoring and LOSA, have been 
developed predominantly for flight operations.
Method: In Study 1, development of MOSS, 12 
test peer-to-peer observations were collected to 
investigate the practicalities of this approach. In Study 
2, deployment of MOSS, seven expert observers col-
lected 56 peer-to-peer observations of line mainte-
nance checks at four stations. Narrative data were 
coded and analyzed according to the threat and error 
management (TEM) framework.
Results: In Study 1, a line check was identified as a 
suitable unit of observation. Communication and third-
party data management were the key factors in gain-
ing maintainer trust. Study 2 identified that on average, 
maintainers experienced 7.8 threats (operational com-
plexities) and committed 2.5 errors per observation. 
The majority of threats and errors were inconsequen-
tial. Links between specific threats and errors leading 
to 36 undesired states were established.
Conclusion: This research demonstrates that obser-
vations of routine maintenance operations are feasible. 
TEM-based results highlight successful management strat-
egies that maintainers employ on a day-to-day basis.
Application: MOSS is a novel approach for safety 
data collection and analysis. It helps practitioners 
understand the nature of maintenance errors, promote 
an informed culture, and support safety management 
systems in the maintenance domain.
Keywords: LOSA, MOSS, threat and error manage-
ment, peer-to-peer observation, undesired state
IntroductIon
Collecting information from daily operations 
has substantial learning potential, allowing the 
causes of failures, their organizational roots, and 
successful recoveries to be identified (O’Leary, 
2002). Achieving an in-depth understanding 
of the error chain helps to develop specific 
management strategies (Hobbs & Williamson, 
2003) and to manage human error like any other 
business risk (Reason & Hobbs, 2003). Predic-
tive tools, such as flight data monitoring and the 
line operations safety audit (LOSA), provide 
information on routine operational performance. 
However, these tools are predominantly focused 
on flight operations. Other areas of the com-
plex aviation system, like aircraft maintenance, 
remain reliant on reactive tools, such as investi-
gations of reported events.
Despite research efforts categorizing the 
types of human error (see Dhillon & Liu, 2006), 
the maintenance industry still lacks an under-
standing of maintenance errors in the organiza-
tional context (Hobbs & Kanki, 2008). This lack 
of understanding is mainly because maintenance 
errors tend to remain hidden (latent), which 
makes them more challenging to detect (Hobbs, 
2004; Reason, 1997). Although the flight crew 
usually get feedback on their actions and see the 
operational effect almost immediately, the con-
sequences of maintainers’ actions may not 
become apparent unless an incident or an acci-
dent occurs (International Civil Aviation Organi-
zation [ICAO], 2002a; McKenna, 2002). Hobbs 
(2004) highlights that until such unsafe actions 
are uncovered, maintainers may continue using 
the same unsafe practices.
Aircraft maintenance is considered a highly 
error-prone activity due to the extensive human 
involvement and system complexities (Hobbs, 
2008; Reason & Hobbs, 2003). Maintenance 
errors reduce safety margins and cause financial 
losses in terms of schedule disruptions; thus 
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effective error management can lead to consid-
erable cost savings (Hobbs & Kanki, 2008).
The maintenance field suffers from a restricted 
supply of information about maintainer and sys-
tem performance. Several researchers highlight 
that maintenance still shows signs of blame cul-
ture (Hobbs, 2008; McDonald, 2006; Patankar & 
Taylor, 2004), which can discourage open report-
ing of maintenance errors (Hobbs & Kanki, 2008). 
The volume of maintenance incident reports is 10 
times lower than reports associated with flight 
operations (Nisula & Ward, cited in Ward, McDon-
ald, Morrison, Gaynor, & Nugent, 2010; Patankar 
& Driscoll, 2004).
Maintenance audits usually focus on quality 
control, regulatory compliance, and adherence 
to procedures but fail to effectively audit perfor-
mance in progress (McDonald, 2003; Reason & 
Hobbs, 2003). Given the evaluative conditions, 
maintainers are likely to alter their behavior. 
Dekker (2003) highlights that many organiza-
tions fail to understand and monitor the practical 
drift between procedures and practice, even 
though there is an apparent conflict between the 
managers’ perception of how work should be 
carried out (i.e., follow procedures to the letter) 
and actual performance, where rigorous adher-
ence to procedures causes delays (McDonald, 
Corrigan, Daly, & Cromie, 2000).
LOSA, defined by 10 operating characteris-
tics (see Table 1), is a tool designed to collect 
data during routine flight operations (see Kli-
nect, Murray, Merritt, & Helmreich, 2003). Its 
origin dates to 1994, when the University of 
Texas was approached to develop an observa-
tional tool able to measure how well crew 
resource management training translates into 
actual flight operations. It uses peer-to-peer 
direct observations to capture how flight crew 
manage, or indeed, mismanage, everyday threats 
and errors. The observers (experienced and 
trained flight crew) write a “story” of a flight, 
which is then coded according to a threat and 
error management (TEM) framework. TEM 
takes into account the operational complexities 
(threats) that are always present in the system as 
well as active failures (flight crew errors) and 
responses to threats and errors. It provides struc-
ture for the data collection and enables the quan-
tification of results (Klinect, 2005).
The developers claim that by establishing 
flight crew trust, LOSA has the ability to collect 
information about flight crew performance 
much closer to operational reality than any other 
safety tool (Klinect et al., 2003). It complements 
existing safety data sources and has the capabil-
ity to assess safety margins, rationalize alloca-
tion of resources, and provide insights into flight 
crew shortcuts and workarounds and serves as a 
baseline for measuring organizational change 
(Federal Aviation Administration [FAA], 2006; 
Ma et al., 2011; Thomas, 2004).
LOSA was also successfully applied in air 
traffic control (Henry et al., 2010; ICAO, 2008), 
the medical industry (Helmreich, 2000, 2003; 
Thomas, Sexton, & Helmreich, 2004), and 
recently, aircraft maintenance. The FAA in col-
laboration with the Air Transport Association in 
the United States developed a maintenance line 
operations safety assessment (M-LOSA), which 
collects observational data using checklists (Ma 
et al., 2011) instead of written narratives. Check-
lists are simple to use, so observers require little 
training. They are also associated with low cost. 
However, the context of the observation cannot 
be fully captured (Stanton et al., 2013), and the 
predefined codes limit what observers record 
(Bakeman, 2000).
In this research we aimed to adapt the origi-
nal LOSA concept (i.e., collecting narrative 
TaBLe 1: LOSA Operating Characteristics
1. Jump seat observations of routine flights  6. Trusted and trained observers
2. Anonymous and nonpunitive data collection  7. Trusted data collection repository
3. Voluntary flight crew participation  8. Data verification roundtables
4. Joint management/pilot union sponsorship  9. Data-derived targets for enhancements
5. Systematic/safety targeted observation instrument  10. Results feedback to line pilots
Note. LOSA = line operations safety audit.
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data) for maintenance operations. Even though 
analysis and coding of free text are very time-
consuming and rather laborious (Stanton et al., 
2013), thoroughly written narratives can capture 
the complexities between the operational con-
text and maintainer performance. They can be 
retrospectively coded for quality purposes and 
uncover previously unidentified codes, and a 
timeline can be produced to establish the links 
between threats, errors, and undesired states. 
Importantly, the narrative text helps to identify 
specific actions that maintainers employ in 
response to threats and errors.
Method
This section describes the conceptual back-
ground and development (Study 1) of the main-
tenance operations safety survey (MOSS) and 
the empirical application of the developed tool 
(Study 2). The research project was conducted 
in accordance with the code of conduct and ethi-
cal guidelines of Cranfield University.
Study 1: MoSS development
We aimed to test whether the 10 LOSA oper-
ating characteristics (see Table 1) can be applied 
in aviation maintenance. To achieve the aim, we 
studied the practicalities of conducting peer-
to-peer observations and writing meaningful 
narratives in the maintenance context. We also 
tested whether the collected information could 
be quantified using the TEM framework.
MoSS design considerations
Maintenance environment versus flight opera-
tions. Maintainers work in a hazardous (Hobbs, 
2008; Kinnison, 2004; Lind, 2008; Reason & 
Hobbs, 2003) and variable environment (Reiman, 
2011) frequently associated with poor lighting, 
temperature variations, humidity, noise, and other 
adverse conditions (Strauch, 2004). In contrast, 
the flight deck offers the comfort of a uniform and 
a highly ordered and air-conditioned environment 
(ICAO, 2002a).
Although flight operations appear to benefit 
from a culture wherein direct observations are 
embraced, maintainers are not regularly observed 
for training and assessment purposes (Hobbs & 
Kanki, 2008). Therefore, the observer becomes 
more visible to the observed maintainer and may 
feel more intrusive than in flight operations. Main-
tainers move around the aircraft, collect spares 
from stores, and frequently return to the office to 
access documentation as part of a check/task. So 
rather than observing a maintainer discretely, the 
observer must follow the maintainer, potentially 
affecting the latter’s behavior. Although it is pos-
sible to keep a distance during certain tasks, such 
as a walk-around, the observer has to get much 
closer when accessing the cabin and the flight 
deck.
Unit of observation. The first step in adapting 
the LOSA methodology was to identify a com-
mon unit or event that could be observed as a 
complete phenomenon from beginning to end 
(Wilkinson, 2000). In flight operations, this 
common unit is a flight, with clear starting and 
finishing points, always following the same 
flight phases (e.g., taxi out, take-off, climb, 
cruise). This common breakdown means that the 
collected information can be compared across 
flights independently from other attributes, such 
as the operator, departure or arrival points, or the 
length of the flight.
In line maintenance, scheduled tasks are usu-
ally organized into a check (e.g., transit, daily, 
weekly). Unscheduled tasks, such as trouble-
shooting and defect rectification, may be per-
formed outside of a scheduled check. Irrespec-
tive of the type, any maintenance task follows 
three stages as per the manufacturers’ publica-
tions: setup, procedure, and close-up (Liston, 
2005). This deconstruction is considered equiva-
lent to the flight phases. Therefore, a line check 
including a set of tasks (both scheduled and 
unscheduled) and involving all three stages rep-
resents the unit of observation.
The setup stage includes any tasks conducted 
in preparation for the check and usually takes 
place in the line office before attending to the 
aircraft. This stage may involve reviewing and 
printing documentation, preparing tools and 
spares, and communicating with other members 
of the team. The procedure stage starts when the 
maintainer arrives at the allocated aircraft. Dur-
ing this stage, the maintainer carries out the 
tasks required by the specific checklist and 
defect rectification according to the technical 
log or any other tasks communicated from main-
tenance control. This stage finishes with the 
maintainer having completed all required tasks 
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and returning back to the line office. During the 
close-up stage, the maintainer carries out neces-
sary actions to complete the line check, (e.g., 
complete appropriate company documentation), 
which usually takes place in the line office.
TEM in the maintenance context. A system-
atic observation requires a coding scheme so 
measurement can occur. Categories or codes are 
an important means of retrieving and organizing 
segments of text relating to particular themes 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994), in this case, to 
MOSS TEM definitions. This section therefore 
outlines the key TEM definitions and the initial 
subcategories of the TEM model applicable in 
the maintenance context.
Before conducting test observations, the 
TEM code lists for flight operations published 
by the International Air Transport Association 
(IATA; 2010), ICAO (2002b), and Klinect 
(2005) were examined. The researcher and an 
experienced maintainer jointly reviewed all of 
these sources. The aim was to select relevant 
TEM subcategories and propose other appropri-
ate threat and error subcategories that reflect the 
maintenance operational complexities. Utilizing 
existing categories as a provisional “start list” 
prior to fieldwork is recommended in research 
literature (Miles & Huberman, 1994).
The top-level categories (threats, errors, and 
undesired states) come from the TEM frame-
work and represent mutually exclusive catego-
ries, as defined by the developers (Klinect, 
2005).
Threats are events or errors that occur outside 
the influence of the maintainer, increase the 
operational complexity of a task, and require the 
maintainer’s attention and management if safety 
margins are to be maintained. Following the 
review process, we identified two threat types 
for MOSS: environmental and organizational. In 
addition to weather threats, the environmental 
category also includes factors related to the air 
traffic control (ATC), airport authority, and 
external operational pressure. These four subcat-
egories have similar characteristics. The organi-
zation has no influence over their occurrence 
and frequency. For example, the allocation of 
aircraft stands for arrivals, departures, and over-
night parking is controlled solely by the local 
airport authority. Therefore, if a maintainer is in 
the middle of a line check and the airport author-
ity requests the aircraft to be towed, it will have 
an implication on the task in progress and the 
overall check. Organizational threats originate 
within the organization. The subcategories are 
defined according to the source of the threat, 
such as flight or cabin crew, dispatch, mainte-
nance control center, aircraft, and so on. For 
example, inaccurate information about a defect 
in the technical log written by the flight crew 
represents a threat for the maintainer addressing 
the specific defect and falls under the category 
“organizational threats–flight/cabin crew.”
Errors are defined as maintainer actions or 
inactions that lead to a deviation from maintainer 
intentions or organizational expectations and 
reduce or have the potential to reduce safety mar-
gins. Following the review process, we identified 
three types of errors for MOSS: aircraft han-
dling, communication, and procedural. Aircraft-
handling errors include incorrect interactions 
with aircraft systems and task action errors, such 
as installation error, removal of wrong parts, or 
servicing errors. Procedural errors are defined 
as maintainer deviations from regulations or com-
pany standard operating procedures. For exam-
ple, a maintainer performing a transit check with-
out the relevant documentation commits a proce-
dural error coded under the category “checklists/
worksheets.” Written communication errors, such 
as technical log entries, are also considered proce-
dural and fall under “documentation errors.” Com-
munication errors include inadequate or absent 
verbal communication between maintainers or 
between maintainers and external personnel, such 
as flight crew, cabin crew, or ground agents.
Undesired states are maintainer error–induced 
states or situations that reduce or have the poten-
tial to reduce safety margins. An undesired state 
is always preceded by an error. According to the 
TEM model, all threats, errors, and undesired 
states have to be recoverable/manageable (Kli-
nect, 2005), which means that normal operations 
can be regained following the threat/error man-
agement. This is an important characteristic 
because undesired states in particular can be 
misinterpreted for negative outcomes, such as 
damage or injury.
Participants. The participating organization 
under study was a large U.K. airline with an air-
craft engineering subsidiary. The subsidiary 
provides base and line maintenance for Boeing 
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and Airbus fleets, engine services, and material 
logistical support both for the company aircraft 
and for third-party organizations. Considering 
these characteristics, it is likely that findings 
from this research will transfer to other mainte-
nance organizations.
A company line maintainer with European 
Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Part 66 license, 
category B1, and over 20 years of experience 
acted as an observer and provided expert advice 
throughout the development phase. The observed 
12 participants were company line maintainers 
with current EASA Part 66 license (category 
type was not collected at this stage).
Procedure overview. The MOSS development 
process (Figure 1) involved an iterative process of 
testing and editing of the observation instrument, 
protocol, and TEM coding (discussed in the next 
sections). The continuous collection of observa-
tional data and subsequent revisions were dis-
cussed between the researcher, the observer, 
company line maintenance manager, and quality 
manager until consensus was achieved.
Overall, 12 test observations of line mainte-
nance checks were conducted. We ensured that 
most of the LOSA operating characteristics (see 
Table 1) were in place before test data collec-
tion. Targets for enhancements were the only 
exception, as we did not expect the operator to 
act on the TEM results from the development 
phase. We had support from the union and man-
agement to conduct peer-to-peer observations. 
The test observations were selected purposely 
(Yin, 2011) during day and night shifts and col-
Review of LOSA protocol &
TEM framework
Familiarization & review of 
maintenance tasks, 
environment, culture 
Test observations conducted by 
the researcher and an 
experienced maintainer
Narrative write-up/ 
validation/TEM analysis
Revision of MOSS 
form/protocol/TEM
Initial draft of MOSS observation 
form/protocol outlined
Final MOSS protocol
Review by operator and industry 
working group/ feedback
Figure 1. Maintenance operations safety survey (MOSS) development process. LOSA = line operations 
safety audit; TEM = threat and error management.
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lected at two different line maintenance stations. 
Two observers, the researcher and an experi-
enced maintainer, trained in TEM jointly con-
ducted the test observations. At the end of each 
observation, the maintainer was asked if he or 
she felt uncomfortable or threatened during the 
observation and if this feeling led to a change of 
behavior. All observations were anonymous, 
nonpunitive, and conducted with prior consent 
from observed maintainers. To minimize infor-
mation loss as a result of memory decay, both 
observers jointly reconstructed the observed 
events and wrote the narrative immediately after 
the completion of each observation (Robson, 
2002; Weick, 1968; Wilkinson, 2000).
Observation instrument. MOSS is based on 
structured observations requiring an observation 
instrument (Robson, 2002). We consulted the 
LOSA observation forms published by ICAO 
(2002b) and by Klinect (2005) and made adapta-
tions to suit this research. Specifically, we 
changed the demographic information and narra-
tive breakdown by task stage. The initial draft 
MOSS form included demographic information 
about the observer, aircraft type, shift type, sta-
tion, date, start and finish time of a check, and 
maintenance type (line, hangar, store, engine 
shop). Also, basic information about the observed 
maintainer was collected: license type, years of 
experience, and years in this position. The narra-
tive was broken down into setup, procedure, and 
close-up as discussed previously.
As the collection of test observations pro-
gressed, we decided to remove the date from 
the demographic section to further protect the 
observed maintainer from identification. We 
inserted additional information regarding the 
task(s) observed, which was split into routine and 
nonroutine (unscheduled), as line checks often 
include both types. Also, the narrative procedure 
stage was separated accordingly. Following the 
completion of the 12 test observations, the MOSS 
observation form was finalized and ready for the 
deployment stage (Study 2). A final version of the 
deidentified MOSS observation form is presented 
in the appendix.
Derivation of TEM codes. The code deriva-
tion process used principles from content analy-
sis (Krippendorff, 2004). With the TEM 
definitions in mind, the narratives were repeatedly 
reviewed to identify threats, errors, and undesired 
states. Separate categories were created for 
responses and outcomes to establish the TEM 
event chain. For example, in the narrative Exam-
ple 1 (Table 2), the duty manager approached the 
maintainer, asking to board. This event is clearly a 
threat, as the interruption has an impact on the 
maintainer’s performance and the situation must 
be managed to ensure safety. According to its ori-
gin, it is coded as “organizational threat–dispatch/
flight operations–request to commence boarding.” 
The maintainer responded to the threat appropri-
ately, so it did not lead to any errors, nor did it 
have any negative impact on the check. Therefore 
the threat was coded as inconsequential. The 
uncoded text provides an important context, 
which, on many occasions, reveals the links 
between TEM events.
The same process was used in identification 
of errors, undesired states, and their manage-
ment. Example 2 (Table 2) presents a scenario of 
an error leading to an additional error. Both 
errors were counted in the results. The main-
tainer misread the aircraft maintenance manual 
(AMM) diagram, which was coded as “proce-
dural error–AMM–misinterpreted or missed 
information.” The maintainer did not initially 
notice this error; therefore it was not managed. 
From a TEM perspective, the outcome was con-
sequential and coded as linked to additional 
error because the maintainer proceeded with a 
removal of a wrong panel (additional error). The 
additional error was coded as “task action error–
removal of wrong parts, panels.” The maintainer 
realized his mistake when looking again at the 
AMM diagram (after the additional error was 
already committed); therefore, he was able to 
manage the additional error by reinstalling the 
wrong panel and a removal of the correct panel 
on the left-hand side. This action means that the 
additional error was successfully managed and 
coded as inconsequential. The maintainer then 
continued with the task.
In Example 3 (Table 2), the allocated main-
tainer did not use a checklist for the transit 
check, which was coded as “procedural error–
check performed from memory.” The error was 
not managed, and as a result, some tasks were 
not completed. From a TEM point of view, the 
error outcome was consequential, meaning it 
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was linked to an undesired state. It was consid-
ered to be an undesired state because of the 
potential that the aircraft would depart in unair-
worthy condition (likely reduced safety mar-
gins), which was coded as “failure to complete 
all checklist items before certification.”
The MOSS TEM coding scheme was system-
atically tested, discussed with the operator, and 
refined with the continual clarification of indi-
vidual codes (Bakeman, 2000; Miles & Huber-
man, 1994).
Key Findings
Following the collection and analysis of 
results from the 12 test observations, we con-
TaBLe 2: Derivation of TEM Codes From Narratives
Narrative Sample (coded text is in italics)
Codes in Hierarchical Order:
TEM Top Level
Threat/Error Type
Threat/Error Category
Specific Subcategory
Example 1: “The maintainer went to the front of the aircraft and 
started an anticlockwise walk-around. After completing the 
walk-around, he then went back to the flight deck and, at the 
boarding door, was asked by the duty manager if boarding 
without flight crew could commence [threat] and answered that it 
could. He then went to the flight deck and configured the aircraft 
for that procedure [response to threat]. This had no impact on 
the flow of the check [threat outcome = inconsequential]. The 
maintainer then left the flight deck and went to the fuel bowser, 
and the flight crew arrived at the aircraft and saw that the refuel 
team had dialed up the departure fuel.”
Threat
Organizational
Dispatch/flight operations
Request to commence boarding
Example 2: “The maintainer took parts, AMM, and tools into the 
forward cargo bay to complete the job (replace forward cargo 
trim valve), entering the freight bay via the access hatch in the 
flight deck. Although he had the AMM, including diagrams, the 
maintainer proceeded to remove the wrong panel (aircraft right-
hand side) [error outcome = linked to additional error], probably 
because the panel had a decal on it that said ‘forward cabin 
trim valve’, he didn’t realize it was not the correct panel [lack 
of response to error]. The maintainer then looked at the AMM 
diagram again and confirmed his mistake (spoke to himself) that 
he misread the diagram [error]. The actual panel was on the 
aircraft left-hand side, which also had a decal but it was in poor 
condition (this read ‘forward cargo trim valve’).”
Error
Procedural
AMM
Misinterpreted or missed 
information
Example 3: “A mechanic was allocated to aircraft with other 
two maintainers. No transit checklist printed but good 
communications between all three maintainers prior to aircraft 
arrival [error]. The mechanic was specifically asked to do engine 
oils and cabin. No checklist (standard practice) [lack of response 
to error] resulted in freight bay inspections being missed so the 
check was incomplete [error outcome = linked to undesired 
state].”
Error
Procedural
Checklists/worksheets
Check performed from memory
Note. TEM = threat and error management; AMM = aircraft maintenance manual. Text in italics is specific to 
individual codes. Roman text provides the context.
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cluded that all 10 operating characteristics (as 
seen in Table 1) could be achieved in the 
maintenance field. Peer-to-peer observations 
were feasible in the busy line environment, and 
maintainers felt comfortable during observations. 
When questioned, all 12 observed maintainers 
confirmed that they trusted their peer conducting 
observations and did not change their behavior 
as a result. Importantly, we did not experience 
any refusals. Test observations were coded 
according to TEM and findings discussed with 
the operator. The results were deemed to reflect 
the nature of line maintenance operations.
Maintainer trust. MOSS success is depen-
dent on maintainer trust. The key to success was 
the thorough face-to-face introduction of the 
project to all participants and union representa-
tives, and frequent communications with the 
maintainers throughout the development phase.
However, the participants’ main concern was 
the use of collected information. It highlighted an 
existing blame culture and concerns over disci-
plinary action. Therefore, it was emphasized that 
we did not collect any information that could lead 
to identification of the observed maintainers. All 
collected information was managed and securely 
stored by the researcher. The independence and 
credibility of the researcher was an important suc-
cess factor. As a result, it is recommended that 
future MOSS applications be carried out in coop-
eration with an independent and trustworthy orga-
nization.
Observation procedure. Because the line 
check is not necessarily a continuous process, 
remaining unobtrusive is challenging and 
observers must be adequately trained. For exam-
ple, while the passengers are boarding or disem-
barking the aircraft, the maintainer is often 
unable to access the flight deck and is forced to 
wait, sometimes for extended periods. Experi-
ence has shown that the maintainer is likely to 
instigate a casual conversation with the observer 
under these circumstances, even asking for a 
professional opinion or help. Such instances 
need to be carefully managed so the observer 
remains friendly but does not become part of the 
line check, thus contaminating the observation.
An observer follows one person at a time, 
usually the maintainer responsible for the certi-
fication of the check/task. If multiple maintain-
ers were involved, they would communicate 
with the certifying maintainer, which would be 
captured in the written narrative.
Study 2: MoSS deployment
After completing the development of the 
MOSS, we tested the tool to determine if it 
could be used reliably to gather meaningful data 
about maintenance tasks.
Participants. Seven maintainers from the 
organization described previously volunteered 
to be trained as observers. All observers held 
current EASA Part 66 license: category A (2), 
category B1 (2), and category B2 (3). Five 
observers were line maintainers, one was a shift 
leader, and one was a training officer.
The observed participants (N = 56) were 
company-approved line maintainers with cur-
rent EASA Part 66 license: category A (12), cat-
egory B1 (15), and category B2 (29).
Procedure. The observers completed 2 days 
of classroom-based training acquiring skills to 
recognize and record TEM events and carry out 
MOSS observations. They were instructed to 
approach maintainers an hour before each obser-
vation to ask for consent and to carry out obser-
vations as discretely as possible. Although 
MOSS aims to record maintainer errors and 
undesired states, the observers would stop an 
observation and intervene if they observed any 
event that may lead to injury, damage, or a 
breach in health and safety regulations. In cases 
where maintainer errors (particularly, omissions 
of tasks) may affect aircraft airworthiness, the 
observers would inform the responsible main-
tainer after the observation so corrective actions 
could take place. The observers were trained to 
record only key information during the actual 
observation, thus limiting the observer impact 
on maintainer behavior, and to write the full nar-
rative as soon as possible (Klinect, 2005; Rob-
son, 2002; Wilkinson, 2000). This approach 
allows the observer to fully concentrate on the 
situation and the environment.
Following the comprehensive training, all 
observers completed a coding exercise recogniz-
ing and recording TEM events in a sample nar-
rative, which aimed to ensure consistent data 
collection. Cronbach’s alpha coefficient, mea-
suring observer consistency, was calculated in 
SPSS Version 21. The coefficient was 0.6, which 
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was satisfactory, considering the exploratory 
nature of the research (Nunnally, 1967, cited in 
Peterson, 1994).
Prior to data collection, all maintainers were 
introduced to MOSS and its anonymous, nonpu-
nitive nature. Overall, seven expert observers 
conducted 56 peer-to-peer observations across 
four line maintenance stations. Narrative data 
were based on unobtrusive direct observations 
of routine line maintenance checks (Kerlinger & 
Lee, 2000; Stanton et al., 2013). All observa-
tions were conducted with prior consent from 
the maintainers allocated to carry out the selected 
line checks. Four different locations were cho-
sen purposely to account for different biases: 
team size, number of daily flights, workload, 
complexity, and culture (Miles & Huberman, 
1994). Stratified purposeful sampling was used 
to determine the number of observations (see 
Table 3). The basis for selecting samples was the 
number of departures in the operator’s flying 
program for a calendar year. Observations were 
selected by the researcher, taking into account 
observer availability and operational require-
ments. The proportions of day/night departures, 
aircraft types, and peak/off-peak periods were 
also considered. The average observation time 
was 2.5 hr. The breakdown of observations by 
line check type is presented in Table 4. All 
checks were observed in their entirety. At the 
end of each observation, the maintainer was 
asked if he or she felt uncomfortable or threat-
ened during the observation and if this feeling 
led to a change of behavior.
Following each observation, the observer 
wrote a detailed narrative (“story”) of the check 
and coded TEM events from the text. The com-
pleted observation form was then sent directly to 
the researcher. The large volume of textual data 
posed a challenge for the researcher. It became 
clear that it was not practical to analyze the data 
manually. To speed up the analytical process, the 
collected observations were uploaded into quali-
tative data analysis software, NVivo Version 9. 
The software is designed to deal with multime-
dia information and text-rich data sets. It sup-
ports effective data management and enables 
coding and quantification of narrative data, que-
ries, analysis, data visualization, and output of 
analysis. The researcher then reviewed the nar-
rative and coding. If there were any discrepan-
cies between the text and the codes assigned by 
the observers, the researcher corrected the cod-
ing. As a second round of the quality process, all 
codes were reviewed again, this time jointly 
with an experienced maintainer. Before com-
TaBLe 3: Proportions of Observations by Line Station and Shift
Shift
Station Day Night Total
A 19 4 23 (41%)
B 14 7 21 (38%)
C  7 2  9 (16%)
D  2 1  3 (5%)
Total 42 (75%) 14 (25%) 56 (100%)
Note. Station A based at a U.K. international airport with 50+ maintainers. Station B based at a U.K. international 
airport with 50+ maintainers. Station C based at a U.K. regional airport with 12 maintainers. Station D based at an 
overseas international airport with five maintainers.
TaBLe 4: Observed Line Checks by Type (N = 56)
Line Check Type Number of Observations
Line A check  1
Supplemental check  1
Weekly  6
Terminal/daily 21
Predeparture 29
Transit  8
ETOPS  8
Note. ETOPS = extended-range twin-engine operations. 
Categories are not mutually exclusive. For example, an 
ETOPS check may be performed together with a daily 
check and count as one observation.
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mencing analysis, the coding was finalized at a 
verification roundtable meeting with a review 
group comprising six company experts. The 
code derivation process followed the same prin-
ciples as previously illustrated in Table 2.
One indication of MOSS success is the degree 
of acceptance from the maintainers, which is 
measured by the number of refusals for observa-
tions. A high denial rate could indicate a lack of 
organizational trust in the methodology and 
compromise the quality of results. MOSS noted 
only two refusals, which suggests that it achieved 
a high level of confidence with observers and par-
ticipants. When questioned, 55 out of the 56 par-
ticipants declared that they trusted the observer 
and did not feel uncomfortable during the obser-
vation. The observation did not lead to any change 
in their behavior. One participant reported that he 
felt uncomfortable but did not feel that it resulted 
in a change of his behavior.
reSultS and dIScuSSIon
The findings show that observations of rou-
tine maintenance operations are feasible and 
provide further knowledge about the nature and 
management of maintenance errors.
threats
Threats were present in 100% of collected 
observations at an average of 7.8 threats per 
observation. Although the threat prevalence 
is similar to flight operations, the average 
frequency is higher in the maintenance field, 
indicating the complexity that maintainers rou-
tinely deal with. The vast majority of threats, 
95%, were organizational and mainly related to 
ground/ramp and aircraft (see Figure 2).
These findings support previous reports 
claiming that the flight deck appears to be sepa-
rated from the organizational context, whereas 
aircraft maintenance is closely linked with and 
influenced by the wider system (McDonald, 
2006; Pettersen & Aase, 2008). According to the 
LOSA Archive (4,532 TEM observations col-
lected between 2002 and 2006 from 25 airlines), 
organizational issues usually influence flight 
crew before the airborne flight phases; on aver-
age, 73% of airline (organizational) threats were 
recorded during predeparture/taxi out (Merritt & 
Klinect, 2006). From the take-off phase until 
arrival to gate, the flight crew operate in a 
seemingly remote environment, away from the 
organization.
Ground/
ramp
31%
Tools/parts/
equipment/
servicing fluids
1%
Flight/
cabin crew
10%
Engineering 
personnel
9%
Organizational 
operational pressure
9%
Environmental 
5%
Dispatch/
flight operations
4%
Documentation
3%
Aircraft
27%
Maintenance control
1%
Figure 2. Proportion of threats by category (N = 439). Organizational threats 
are depicted in white; environmental threats are shown in gray.
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Maintainers are influenced by various organi-
zational factors and carry out tasks in a busy 
ramp environment at the same time as ground 
operations, such as loading and unloading air-
craft, refueling, and servicing (see Figure 2), 
supporting previous findings that the origin of 
human failure is largely associated with organi-
zational and management factors (Antonovsky, 
Pollock, & Straker, 2014; Hobbs, 2008; McDon-
ald et al., 2000; Reason & Hobbs, 2003; Saleh, 
Marais, Bakolas, & Cowlagi, 2010; Tsagkas, 
Nathanael, & Marmaras, 2014).
errors
Errors were noted in 86% of observations, 
at an average of 2.5 errors per observation, but 
79% were procedural and mainly associated 
with noncompliance (see Figure 3). The level 
of noncompliance corresponds with analysis 
of engineering reports submitted to the U.K. 
Confidential Human Factors Incident Reporting 
Programme, which noted 88% noncompliance 
with procedures (Skinner, 2010). LOSA expe-
rience suggests that increased noncompliance 
leads to declining safety margins, as the opera-
tor usually experiences higher rates in misman-
aged threats, errors, and undesired aircraft states 
(Merritt, 2005).
Some consider work-around practices as a 
source of system resilience to compensate for 
inadequate resources (e.g., time, tools, docu-
mentation) available to complete certain tasks 
(Dekker, 2003; McDonald, 2003; Pettersen, 
McDonald, & Engen, 2010; Reiman, 2011; 
Tsagkas et al., 2014). Although such practices 
are externally viewed as routine nonadherence, 
the ability to adapt, compromise, and improvise 
is considered internally as a mark of expertise, 
pride, and professionalism (Dekker, 2003; 
McDonald, 2003).
When interpreting MOSS results, it is impor-
tant to distinguish if an error was spontaneous 
(no observable reason for the error) or linked to 
a threat or a previous error. For example, if a 
maintainer failed to use a checklist because the 
printer did not work, it would be classified as an 
error linked to a threat, which can be eliminated 
by implementing a suitable strategy to manage 
Checklists/
worksheets
54%
Documentation
15%
AMM
5%
Non-adherence
to SOPs
5%
Task action
9%
Aircraft
systems
1%
Other
3%
Communication
8%
Figure 3. Proportion of errors by category (N = 138). Procedural errors 
are depicted in white; aircraft handling errors are highlighted in gray; 
communication errors are shown in black. AMM = aircraft maintenance 
manual; SOP = standard operating procedure.
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the threat. If there was no observable reason for 
the failure to use a checklist, it would be a spon-
taneous error, which requires a different correc-
tive action. Although the errors are essentially 
the same (noncompliance), understanding the 
differences in the error chain helps to develop 
appropriate remedial strategies.
A spontaneous error may be individual or cul-
tural. An individual error is associated with per-
sonal physiological factors, such as stress or lack 
of sleep. A cultural error is the same category of 
error (e.g., failure to use checklists/worksheets) 
committed by different individuals and repeatedly 
observed. Spontaneous individual errors are 
essentially much harder to predict and manage 
because the underlying factors are not usually 
observable. In MOSS, 45% of all errors were 
spontaneous, frequently associated with the fail-
ure to use checklists/worksheets. This finding may 
point toward cultural error, given that this specific 
error was observed in 50% of the 56 collected 
observations. The reason may be that frequent per-
formance of a task, such as the line check, becomes 
an automatic process for the individual (Dismukes 
& Berman, 2010). The checklist is viewed as 
guidance for less experienced maintainers (Pearl 
& Drury, 1995), or there is an issue with the actual 
checklist as suggested by Drury and Dempsey 
(2012). They concluded that checklists can be 
powerful tools but only when the design is appro-
priate and validated by the actual users to ensure 
that the format, sequence of tasks, and content 
result in reliable performance.
MOSS findings showed that maintainers gen-
erally used checklists for weekly and A checks 
but did not use them for daily, transit, and pre-
flight checks. According to the maintainers, the 
records department required only weekly/A 
checklists to be archived. More importantly, the 
checklists were too long, contained tasks that 
were not possible to complete during the allo-
cated time, and were not designed according to 
the usual sequence of tasks that maintainers fol-
low. As a result, maintainers questioned the use 
of such checklists and perceived them unwork-
able. As a response to the findings, the operator 
set up a working group to review the checklist 
design. This example shows that MOSS can 
present the operators with information about the 
scale of a specific issue and an opportunity to 
develop appropriate management strategies.
undesired States
Ineffective error management can lead to 
additional errors or undesired states. Even 
though the majority of observed errors were 
inconsequential, 26% of errors resulted in unde-
sired states, which were noted in 34% of col-
lected observations. There were 36 observed 
undesired states, mainly associated with aircraft 
areas not being checked for damage, the aux-
iliary power unit left running unattended, or 
failure to complete all checklist items before 
certification. The LOSA Archive suggests that 
in flight operations, an average of 30% of 
undesired states originated in threats (Merritt 
& Klinect, 2006). In contrast, our MOSS study 
identified 86% of undesired states linked to 
threats. For example, on 20 occasions, the event 
chain started with a ground/ramp threat disrupt-
ing the walk-around. The maintainer committed 
an error because the threat was not effectively 
managed. Then, due to ineffective error man-
agement, it resulted in an undesired state.
Inadequate walk-arounds, frequently linked 
to threats (disruptions and interruptions), and 
thus a maintainer’s failure to notice missing or 
incorrectly closed panels, cowling, or door 
latches, have previously led to serious incidents, 
damage, and considerable costs (e.g., Air Acci-
dent Investigation Branch, 2013). Therefore, 
MOSS presents an opportunity for significant 
safety improvements if the appropriate threats 
are addressed. The data also show that mainte-
nance error is usually a result of organizational 
issues; hence, addressing such factors, rather 
than punishing the individual, can lead to prog-
ress in safety (Dekker, 2006; Leveson, 2004; 
Reason & Hobbs, 2003). Managers can target 
specific threats, help maintainers better recog-
nize and manage those threats, and consequently 
eliminate associated errors and undesired states.
teM
Although threat, error, and undesired-state 
frequencies provide valuable information, the 
examination of TEM strategies is more diag-
nostic. Currently, safety in aircraft maintenance 
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is measured negatively, based on the number 
of audit findings, reportable events, incidents, 
or accidents. MOSS highlighted not only the 
weaknesses but also the strengths of the system 
in terms of successful threat and error recover-
ies. As depicted in Tables 5 and 6, the majority 
of threats and errors were inconsequential, 84% 
and 70%, respectively. Helmreich (2001) argues 
that such findings show the merit of observing 
routine operations. Given the absence of nega-
tive outcomes, these events would not be picked 
up by any other safety tool currently available in 
the maintenance field.
For effective TEM, the threats and errors must 
first be detected. According to Klinect (2010), 
flight crew typically notice the undesired state first 
TaBLe 5: Proportions of Inconsequential and Mismanaged Threats by Category (N = 439)
Threat Category
Threat Count
Inconsequential Mismanaged
Ground/ramp 101 36
Aircraft 101 19
Flight/cabin crew  41  4
Engineering personnel  39  3
Organizational operational pressure  36  3
Environmental  18  2
Dispatch/flight operations  16  0
Documentation  11  1
Tools parts/equipment/servicing fluids  4  1
Maintenance control  2  1
Total threats 369 (84%) 70 (16%)
Note. A mismanaged threat is linked to a maintainer error. It means that the threat was either not managed 
appropriately or not managed at all.
TaBLe 6: Proportions of Inconsequential and Mismanaged Errors by Category (N = 138)
Error Category
Error Count
Inconsequential Mismanaged
Procedural errors  
 Checklists/worksheets 47 28
 Documentation 17  3
 AMM  6  1
 Nonadherence to company SOPs  2  5
Aircraft handling errors  
 Task action 10  2
 Aircraft systems  2  0
 Other  3  1
Communication errors  9  2
Total errors 96 (70%) 42 (30%)
Note. AMM = aircraft maintenance manual; SOP = standard operating procedure; documentation = cabin and 
technical logs. A mismanaged error is linked to an additional error or linked to an undesired state. It means that 
the error was either not managed appropriately or not managed at all.
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rather than the error or errors contributing to that 
state. The detection is linked to the immediacy of 
feedback following flight crew actions because 
the error is usually less noticeable than the unde-
sired aircraft state. Because undesired aircraft 
states are associated with aircraft deviations or 
incorrect configurations, the flight crew are likely 
to receive cues in a form of warnings, instrument 
readings, or aircraft behavior.
The level of errors that were undetected or 
unattended was significantly higher in mainte-
nance than in flight operations. In our study, 93% 
of errors were undetected or unattended, com-
pared with an average of 45% identified in the 
LOSA Archive (Merritt & Klinect, 2006). This 
difference can be attributed to the lack of feedback 
to maintainer actions, a distinct feature of mainte-
nance work. In contrast to the typical multicrew 
environment, maintainers frequently work alone 
and must remain vigilant to catch and correct their 
own errors. Maintainers do not benefit from the 
immediate cues received by the flight crew except 
when maintenance tasks require subsequent func-
tional checks or duplicate inspections. Even in the 
latter case, functional checks or inspections may 
be conducted with significant time delay (e.g., by 
a different shift). Therefore, it may not be immedi-
ately apparent if safety margins are reduced as a 
result of maintainer actions.
limitations and Future research
The practical experience and observer feed-
back identified improvements for future MOSS 
applications, particularly in terms of observer 
training. It is recommended that MOSS observer 
training be extended from 2 days to 3 days. The 
training should also include a team debrief after 
each observer has conducted his or her first test 
observation. Furthermore, the experience high-
lighted that future MOSS applications would ben-
efit from testing observer consistency following 
completion of his or her first test observation in 
the operational environment. This test observation 
provides an opportunity to practice all of the skills 
accumulated during the observer training and to 
clear any possible misconceptions. As a result, 
observer knowledge and application of TEM is 
likely to improve; hence the internal consistency 
score would be expected to increase. It was not 
possible to extend observer training during the first 
MOSS application due to time constraints and the 
observers’ limited availability. Also, the internal 
consistency among observers measured by Cron-
bach’s alpha coefficient was found at the minimum 
acceptable level. Although this level was adequate, 
considering the exploratory nature of this research, 
subsequent MOSS applications should increase the 
number of items measuring observer consistency. 
However, it is possible that the TEM knowledge 
retention decays over time; hence a test-retest reli-
ability measure would be perhaps more appropri-
ate, especially in cases when a prolonged period is 
required for data collection.
Moreover, the strict anonymity associated 
with the data collection and the naturalistic 
characteristic of observations made it impossi-
ble to determine if an individual maintainer was 
observed more than once. Although it is believed 
that this limitation did not have negative impact 
on the collected information, it should be con-
sidered when interpreting the results.
This study involved a single organization, so 
efforts are under way to apply MOSS in other 
maintenance organizations to further refine the 
tool and enable benchmarking. Importantly, the 
application of MOSS at other organizations and 
the development of an archive of MOSS data for 
benchmarking is likely to facilitate future research 
and enhance the knowledge of maintenance errors 
and strategies for effective TEM in the mainte-
nance field.
Another direction for future research would be 
to link MOSS results with findings from other 
safety data sources. This linking of results would 
be particularly desirable given that MOSS is lim-
ited to observable events only. For example, the 
relationship between spontaneous errors and non-
observable causal factors, such as stress or fatigue, 
could be explored. Incident reports collected by 
the IATA global aviation safety data-sharing pro-
gram, STEADES, could be a suitable data set 
especially because IATA uses the TEM frame-
work for analysis. Research could also establish 
whether MOSS findings correlate with specific 
incident outcomes.
Implications for Practitioners
MOSS is a new diagnostic tool that provides 
management with information about routine 
operations. Unlike other safety tools, it has the 
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potential to identify organizational strengths by 
capturing the successful TEM strategies that main-
tainers routinely employ. The findings support an 
effective safety management system, training, and 
systemic change. Conducting MOSS also leads 
to improvements in communication between line 
staff and managers. The organization under study 
noted an increased reporting rate and improved 
trust in management as the maintainers received 
timely feedback and were subsequently involved 
in working groups to address key findings.
The MOSS implementation cycle is shown in 
Figure 4. A key challenge of this tool is the vast 
volume of textual data, which requires proficient 
knowledge of the TEM framework and resources 
for data analysis. Considering the prevalence of 
blame culture within maintenance organizations, 
it is advisable to follow the LOSA Collaborative 
model. For a successful implementation of 
MOSS, a credible third party—ideally, an inde-
pendent research organization—should work 
closely with the maintenance operators to act as 
a trusted data repository and to deliver the MOSS 
data analyses. Therefore, confidentiality and 
trust can be maintained while industrywide learn-
ing through benchmarking is facilitated.
We attempted to develop a practical safety 
tool that would encourage organizational learn-
ing and benchmarking across the aircraft main-
tenance industry and that would ultimately lead 
to safety improvements. Although it is possible 
for an organization to conduct its own MOSS, 
the current research program has been designed 
around the implementation of MOSS by a 
Management/union 
commitment
MOSS promotion 
Observer selection/training
Observation scheduling
Data collection 
(Peer-to-peer observations)
Data validation/verification 
roundtables
Data analysis
MOSS results
Review 
Feed to operationsFeed to training Feed to SMS
Change implementation
P
eriodic assessm
ent =
m
easuring change effectiveness 
and benchm
arking
Figure 4. Maintenance operations safety survey (MOSS) implementation cycle.
SMS = safety management system.
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third-party provider, in a similar fashion to the 
approach taken by the LOSA Collaborative. 
Therefore, continuous collaboration between the 
research community and the industry is needed 
to further enhance the MOSS tool in order to 
produce similar safety contributions to those 
realized by LOSA in flight operations.
concluSIon
This study provides evidence that LOSA 
principles, in their original form (i.e., based on 
narrative data collection), are applicable to the 
maintenance environment. MOSS provides a 
novel approach for safety data collection and 
analysis in aircraft maintenance. Unlike incident 
and accident data, MOSS collects comprehen-
sive and standardized information that can be 
communicated effectively to managers to sup-
port organizational change. We have developed 
a practical predictive safety tool that will assist 
practitioners in promoting an informed culture 
and support an effective safety management 
system in the maintenance domain.
MOSS records maintainers’ responses and 
the outcomes for each threat, error, and unde-
sired state; therefore the full chain of events can 
be examined. Understanding the link between 
specific types of threats and errors helps manag-
ers to develop targeted strategies to reduce or 
eliminate specific types of maintenance error.
The theoretical gain from this research lies 
in the application of the TEM concept in the 
maintenance context. This study generated 
new knowledge to enhance the understanding 
of maintenance errors in the detection of and 
recovery from threats, errors, and undesired 
states. TEM-driven data collection and analy-
sis highlights the proportion of detected and 
successfully managed threats and errors, and 
allows the identification of management strat-
egies that maintainers employ on a day-to-day 
basis.
Key PoIntS
 • Line operations safety audit principles and the 
threat and error management framework are found 
to be applicable to the line maintenance environ-
ment.
 • The maintenance operations safety survey 
(MOSS) is a novel safety data tool that collects 
standardized information from routine mainte-
nance operations and promotes an informed cul-
ture and supports effective safety management 
systems in the maintenance domain.
 • Besides systemic weaknesses, MOSS results also 
illustrate the strengths of the maintenance orga-
nization. Examination of inconsequential threats 
and errors helps managers to understand the suc-
cessful strategies that maintainers employ on a 
day-to-day basis.
aPPendIx
Maintenance operations Safety Survey observation Form
Observer ID 999 Start time (HH:MM) 18.05
Observation number 99 End time (HH:MM) 18.50
Aircraft type A320 Line  
Station XXX Hangar
Shift Day Store
Season Summer Engine shop
Details of Task(s) Observed
Routine Nonroutine
Night-stop check and shift handover None
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Personnel Demographics
Qualifications/license type A
Years of experience (YY) 10
Years in this position (YY) 6
Setup
Describe what happened in general terms. What was done well? What was done badly? How were 
threats, errors, and significant events handled?
  Mechanic allocated by shift leader to do a night-stop check. There were no reports from  
 maintenance control of any inbound defects, so no preplanning was needed. No checklist was  
 printed for the night stop (standard practice).
Procedure–Routine
Describe what happened in general terms. What was done well? What was done badly? How were 
threats, errors, and significant events handled?
  Early evening but still good daylight. The mechanic arrived just as jetty being attached, he made 
good effort to see around door 2L before it was positioned. Started walk-around from under D2L. 
No obstructions at forward end of aircraft; however, baggage belt attached at aft cargo door 
causing an obstruction to view aft freight door and surround. A set of rear steps was also fitted to 
this aircraft obscuring D4L, but the mechanic made every effort to inspect door area. The walk-
around was completed to the point of origin without any disruptions.
 The mechanic then inspected both engine oils, which didn’t require additional fluid. Both IDGs were 
also inspected. All panels being opened were then closed all satisfactory. The mechanic then went 
to his van to collect a set of steps to enter the avionics bay to change FDAMS card. The ground 
power connection was in the way and so the steps were positioned as close to the hatch as 
possible but meant the mechanic had to lean sideways on the ladder to access bay (unstable step 
ladder). All completed satisfactory.
 The mechanic then went up the jetty to enter the aircraft. The pilot was on the jetty and had a 
good conversation (both technical and nontechnical) with the mechanic. A couple of wheelchair 
passengers were still on the aircraft, but both pilot and mechanic managed to enter the aircraft 
without delay. Pilot stopped to show mechanic overhead locker problem that the cabin crew had 
entered in Cabin Log and that he had transferred to Tech Log. Mechanic then reviewed both 
Cabin and Tech Logs and carried out a limited amount of flight deck checks (recorded figures). He 
then turned main aircraft power off, selected ground service power to enable cleaners/caterers to 
have lighting and hoover socket power, and then left aircraft, shutting D2L on exiting. No attempt 
was made to go back to aft cargo bay for second unobstructed view. Both Tech and Cabin Logs 
removed from aircraft and returned to office with mechanic.
 at Cranfield University on November 14, 2016hfs.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Maintenance OperatiOns safety survey 1003
Procedure–Nonroutine
Describe what happened in general terms. What was done well? What was done badly? How were 
threats, errors, and significant events handled?
 None actioned.
Close-up
Describe what happened in general terms. What was done well? What was done badly? How were 
threats, errors, and significant events handled?
 On return to office, the night shift had just arrived. The mechanic gave good verbal and visual 
handover using the logs as props. As no checklist had been used, the mechanic told the night 
shift what was left to do. The verbal handover was good and complete although nothing was 
documented.
Observation Overall
 Overall a good external walk-around although no attempt was made to revisit areas that had 
been obscured by ground handling equipment. Outstanding mechanic to flight/cabin crew 
communication, resulting in mechanic not only being told what was wrong but actually shown what 
was wrong with certain defects.
Threat Management Worksheet
Threat Description Threat Management
ID Describe the threat Task stage
Effectively  
managed?
How was the threat man-
aged or mismanaged?
T1 Jetty was being attached  
just as the mechanic  
arrived to the aircraft.
Procedure–routine Yes He made a good effort 
to see around the door 
2L before the jetty was 
attached.
T2 Baggage belt attached  
at aft cargo door causing  
an obstruction to view 
of aft freight door and 
surround.
Procedure–routine No No attempt to go back 
to aft cargo bay and 
inspect the area after the 
equipment was removed.
T3 A set of rear steps was  
fitted to the aircraft 
obscuring D4L.
Procedure–routine Yes The mechanic made every 
effort to inspect the area 
of D4L.
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